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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a variant of searchable
public-key encryption named hidden-token searchable public-key
encryption with two new security properties: token anonymity
and one-token-per-trapdoor. With the former security notion,
the client can obtain the search token from the data owner
without revealing any information about the underlying keyword.
Meanwhile, the client cannot derive more than one token from
one trapdoor generated by the data owner according to the latter
security notion. Furthermore, we present a concrete hidden-
token searchable public-key encryption scheme together with the
security proofs in the random oracle model.
Index Terms—Searchable Encryption, Public-Key, Hidden-
Token, Random Oracle Model
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the development and deployment of Inter-
net of Things (IoT) have gained substantial attention in the
industry and research community since it enables people to
collect data everywhere including environment, infrastructures
and businesses. However, it is not easy to store this huge
amount of information locally. The popular solution nowadays
is to outsource these data to a third party (e.g. the cloud).
While these data are the assets of the one who implemented
the devices of IoT, they should be encrypted before outsource,
which at the same time jeopardizes the usefulness of these
data, such as searchability.
To solve this dilemma between usefulness and conﬁdential-
ity of data, many research efforts have been proposed, e.g.
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [1], [2], Private Information Re-
trieval (PIR) [3], [4] and Searchable Encryption (SE) [5], [6],
[7], [8]. Among these, searchable encryption, which enables
searchability on ciphertexts, is the most promising technique.
For instance, the SE scheme in [8] allows many data sources
to generate encrypted index of the data and the data owner
to delegate the searchability by giving search trapdoors to
the clients. By using this SE scheme, the devices of IoT can
encrypt the collected data, and upload the resulting ciphertexts
with the index generated by using this SE scheme to the cloud
directly. Meanwhile, the data owner can generate the search
trapdoor according to the query from the client, who can later
use the search token generated from the trapdoor to ask the
cloud do the search on the index. The high level description
of the above framework is given in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. Architecture of our framework
In most of the existing SE schemes, the data owner is
usually considered as trusted, while the cloud and the client
are considered as malicious. They focus on how to protect the
conﬁdentiality of the trapdoor and the corresponding keyword,
while the privacy of the client is always ignored. However, in
some situations, the way how the client deals with the data
could be considered as an asset. For example, the information
of stock market and how to deal with the information are both
valuable. Hence, the keyword corresponding to the trapdoor
should be also protected. Once the client privacy (keyword
hidden) is considered, the beneﬁt of the data owner could be
hurt. For example, without knowing the underlying keyword of
the trapdoor, the client could trick the data owner to generate
one trapdoor corresponding to many tokens. It is not good for
the data owner especially when the payment of data service
is based on how many tokens the client obtains.
To address the above challenges, in this paper, we pro-
pose a variant of searchable encryption, named hidden-token
searchable encryption. One of the important security properties
of hidden-token searchable encryption is to protect the client
privacy, i.e., the data owner cannot deduce the keyword corre-
sponding to the queried trapdoor. Besides, we also guarantee
the beneﬁt of the data owner when the client privacy is under
protection, i.e., one trapdoor can derive only one token. The
contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.
• To protect the client privacy while guaranteeing the ben-
eﬁt of the data owner, we propose the concept of hidden-
token searchable encryption, including its deﬁnitions and
security models.
• We present the ﬁrst concrete hidden-token searchable
encryption scheme along with its security analysis.
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Generally speaking, there are two kinds of searchable
encryption, one is searchable symmetric-key encryption, the
other is searchable public-key encryption.
Song et al. [5] were the ﬁrst one using symmetric-key
encryption to address keyword search on encrypted data.
Later, many works have been done in this area [5], [9], [10].
The term of Searchable Symmetric-Key Encryption was ﬁrst
introduced by Curtmola et al. [6]. After that, Kamara et al.
[11] proposed a dynamic searchable encryption which extends
the scheme in [6]. To make the searchable symmetric-key
encryption more expressive, in 2013, Cash et al. [12] proposed
a practical highly-scalable searchable symmetric encryption
which is quite efﬁcient and expressive. Later, many schemes
have been proposed based on this scheme. In 2013, Jarecki
et al. [13] proposed searchable symmetric encryption with
private information retrieval. In 2014, Cash et al. [14] proposed
dynamic searchable encryption which extends [12]. To make
the scheme in [12] more expressive, in 2016, Zuo et al. [7]
proposed a trusted boolean search on cloud using searchable
symmetric encryption.
In the line of research of searchable symmetric-key encryp-
tion, the most basic setting is where the data owner is the
one who performing the search on the encrypted database
which is stored in a third party (e.g. the cloud). The work
of Curtmola et al. [6] was the ﬁrst scheme to extend the two-
party model (the data owner and the server) of SSE to the
multi-client setting. However, this scheme did not allow the
interaction between the data owner and the client in each query
which led to the inefﬁcient implementation. To circumvent this
obstacle, in 2010, Chase et al. [15] introduced a SSE with
controlled disclosure which allowed such interaction. Later,
in 2011, to protect the privacy of the query, De Cristofaro
et al. [16] proposed a privacy-preserving sharing of sensitive
information scheme which extended the multi-client SSE to
the OSPIR setting. Later, [13] introduced a more expressive
and scalable SSE with OSPIR by using the technique of [12].
Most of the above schemes do not consider the protection
of the client privacy, only the scheme in [16], [13] considered
the multi-client with private information retrieval which called
OSPIR. However, in OSPIR, the data owner still knows some
information about the keyword, e.g., the attribute.
The concept of Searchable Public-Key Encryption was ﬁrst
introduced by Boneh et al. [8]. Later, many schemes [17],
[18], [19] improved the security of the scheme. In [18],
Rhee et al. ﬁrst gave the security notion named trapdoor
indistinguishability against an active attacker who is able to
get trapdoors for any keyword of his choice. This security
of a trapdoor guarantees that the trapdoor does not reveal
any information on any keyword without the data owners
secret key. However, this security is different from the one we
study in this paper. In particular, we aim to guarantee that the
data owner cannot know the keyword from trapdoors, while
trapdoor indistinguishability cannot guarantee this. In [19],
Zhu et al. proposed a searchable public-key encryption scheme
which provided predicate privacy. However, the scheme cannot
hide the keyword from the data owner who is responsible
for issuing the trapdoor either. Moreover, this scheme is quite
inefﬁcient in the real world.
The main difference between searchable symmetric-key
encryption and searchable public-key encryption is that the
encryption key is public or not. Recall the IoT application
of searchable encryption, searchable public-key encryption is
more suitable. Hence, in this paper, we only consider the
(hidden-token) searchable public-key encryption.
B. Organization
The remaining paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we give the deﬁnition of our hidden-token searchable public-
key encryption (HSPE) and the corresponding security models.
Besides that, we also give the necessary background for our
assumption. After that, we present a concrete HSPE scheme
in Section III and its security analysis in Section IV. Finally,
we give the conclusion in Section V.
II. DEFINITIONS AND SECURITY MODELS
In this section, we present a variant of searchable public-
key encryption named hidden-token searchable public-key en-
cryption (HSPE), including its deﬁnitions and security models.
Compared to the normal searchable public-key encryption,
HSPE aims to prevent the search keyword of clients being
leaked to the data owner while protecting the data owner’s
rights. Furthermore, in this section we also review the com-
plexity assumptions that are used to prove the security of our
proposed HSPE scheme.
A. Deﬁnition of Hidden-Token Searchable Public-Key Encryp-
tion
As mentioned before, HSPE aims to keep the search key-
word of clients secret from the data owner, while clients
cannot abuse this property. For easy expression, we separate
the trapdoor generation algorithm in the normal searchable
public-key encryption into three algorithms: Randomization,
Trapdoor Generation and Token Generation algorithms. The
details of the deﬁnition are as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 (Hidden-Token Searchable Public-Key Encryp-
tion). A hidden-token searchable public-key encryption scheme
consists of the following algorithms:
• (pk, sk) ← Setup(1λ): It takes the security parame-
ter 1λ as input, the setup algorithm Setup outputs a
public-key pk and the corresponding private key sk. This
algorithm is usually performed by the data owner who
owns the data stored in a third party, e.g., a cloud.
• (s, kw′) ← Rand(kw, pk): It takes a keyword kw and
(part of) the public-key as input, the keyword random-
ization algorithm Rand outputs a masked keyword kw′
corresponding to kw and a state s. This algorithm is
usually performed by the client who wants to do the
search on the encrypted data.
• (trapkw) ← Trap(kw′, sk, pk): It takes a masked key-
word kw′ corresponding to kw and the key pair (sk, pk)
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as input, the trapdoor generation algorithm Trap outputs
a trapdoor trapkw corresponding to the masked keyword
kw′. This algorithm is usually performed by the data
owner who holds the private key sk.
• (tokenkw) ← Token(trapkw, s, pk): It takes a trap-
door trapkw and state value s corresponding to the
masked keyword kw′, and (part of) public-key pk as input,
the token generation algorithm Token outputs a token
tokenkw corresponding to the masked keyword kw′. This
algorithm is usually performed by the client who wants
to do the search on the encrypted data.
• (Ikw) ← Index(kw, pk): It takes a keyword kw and
(part of) a public-key pk as input, the index generation
algorithm Index outputs an index Ikw of the data stored
in the third party. This algorithm can be performed by
the party who holds the public key pk.
• (1 or 0) ← Test(IkwI , tokenkwt , pk): It takes an index
IkwI corresponding to keyword kwI , a token tokenkwt
corresponding to keyword kwt, and (part of) the public-
key pk as input, the test algorithm Test outputs 1 if
kwI = kwt or 0 otherwise.
Correctness. The correctness of a HSPE scheme
requires that (pk, sk) ← Setup(1λ), and any pair
(s, kw′) ← Rand(kwt, pk), the following conditions
must hold: if kwt = kwI , then the value of
Test(Index(kwI , pk),Token(Trap(kw
′, sk, pk), s, pk), pk)
is 1; otherwise, it is 0.
B. Security Models of Hidden-Token Searchable Public-Key
Encryption
Like the normal searchable public-key encryption, the
hidden-token searchable public-key encryption should hold In-
dex Anonymity security that aims to prevent adversaries know-
ing keywords of the data from the index. Furthermore, as the
underlying applications require, the hidden-token searchable
public-key encryption should also hold Token Anonymity to
prevent the data owner knowing search keywords of clients via
the trapdoor generation, and One-Token-Per-Trapdoor security
to prevent clients abusing the token anonymity security. The
details are as follows.
1) Index Anonymity: The index anonymity is deﬁned via
the following game between a challenger C and an adversary
A.
• Setup: The challenger C takes a security parameter 1λ
and runs Setup algorithm to get a key pair (pk, sk). It
gives the adversary A the resulting pk while keeping the
secret key sk to itself.
• Phase 1: In this phase, A is allowed to query the
following oracles adaptively.
– Orand(kw): On input a keyword kw, C returns a
corresponding masked keyword kw′ and a state s.
– Otrap(kw′): On input a masked keyword kw′, where
kw′ is generated from Orand, C returns the corre-
sponding trapdoor trapkw.
– Otoken(trapkw, s): On input a trapdoor trapkw cor-
responding to the masked keyword kw′ and a state s,
where (kw′, s) are generated from Rand(kw, pk),
C returns the corresponding token tokenkw.
• Challenge: A sends two keywords kw∗0 , kw∗1 of equal
length to C. kw0 and kw1 are restricted by the following
condition: The adversary never queries Otrap with kw′
corresponding to kw∗0 or kw
∗
1 . Note that oracle Otrap
never answers the query with kw′ that is not from Orand,
which enables the challenger C to check whether kw0 and
kw1 violate the above restriction. On receiving the valid
kw∗0 , kw
∗
1 , C encapsulates kw∗b as the challenge Index
I∗kw∗b to A, where b is chosen randomly from {0, 1}.
• Phase 2: Almost the same as Phase 1, except that the
restriction in Challenge phase also validates in this phase.
• Guess: A outputs a guess b′ of b, and wins the game if
b = b′.
The advantage AdvIA(1λ) is deﬁned as |Pr[b = b′] − 1/2|
for the index anonymity game. The HSPE scheme is said to be
CPA−IA secure if all efﬁcient adversaries A, the advantage
AdvIA(1
λ) is negligible.
2) Token Anonymity: The token anonymity is also deﬁned
by a game played between a challenger C and an adversary A.
As mentioned before, the token anonymity is used to prevent
the data owner knowing search keywords of clients. In this
case, the data owner could be corrupted by the adversary.
• Setup: Identical to that in the index anonymity game.
• Phase 1: A is allowed to query the following oracles
adaptively.
– Osk(pk): On input the public-key pk, C returns the
corresponding private key sk. Note that this oracle
is allowed to be queried only once during the whole
game.
– Orand(kw): On input a keyword kw, C returns a
corresponding masked keyword kw′ and a state s.
– Otrap(kw′): On input a masked keyword kw′, C
returns the corresponding trapdoor trapkw.
– Otoken(trapkw, s): On input a trapdoor trapkw
corresponding to the masked keyword kw′ and a
state s, C returns the corresponding token tokenkw.
• Challenge: A sends two keywords kw∗0 , kw∗1 of equal
length to C. C generates the masked keyword kw′b∗ and
returns to A as the challenge masked keyword, where b
is chosen randomly from {0, 1}.
• Phase 2: Identical to Phase 1.
• Guess: A outputs a guess b′ of b, and wins the game if
b = b′.
The advantage AdvTA(1λ) is deﬁned as |Pr[b = b′] − 1/2|
for the token anonymity game. The HSPE scheme is said to be
CPA−TA secure if all efﬁcient adversaries A, the advantage
AdvTA(1
λ) is negligible.
3) One-Token-Per-Trapdoor: The One-Token-Per-Trapdoor
security guarantees that clients can only derive one token
from one trapdoor, which prevents clients abusing the token
anonymity. Likewise, it is also deﬁned by a game played
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between a challenger C and an adversary A. The details are
as follows.
• Setup: Identical to that in the index anonymity game.
• Phase 1: A is allowed to query the following oracles
adaptively.
– Orand(kw): On input a keyword kw, C returns a
corresponding masked keyword kw′ and a state s.
– Otrap(kw′): On input a masked keyword kw′, C
returns the corresponding trapdoor trapkw.
– Otoken(trapkw, s): On input a trapdoor trapkw
corresponding to the masked keyword kw′ and a
state s, C returns the corresponding token tokenkw.
• Challenge: A sends a masked keyword kw′∗ to C. C
outputs Trap(kw′∗, sk) as the challenge trapdoor.
• Phase 2: Identical to Phase 1.




′∗, s∗b) ← Rand(kw∗b , pk) and
kw∗0 = kw∗1 , A wins the game.
The advantage AdvOT (1λ) is deﬁned as Pr[A wins] for
the one-token-per-trapdoor security game. The HSPE scheme
is said to be OT secure if all efﬁcient adversaries A, the
advantage AdvOT (1λ) is negligible.
C. Bilinear Map and Complexity Assumptions
In this part, we will brieﬂy review the bilinear map, deci-
sional bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman assumption and extended dis-
crete logarithm assumption that will be used in our proposal.
1) Bilinear Map: Let G and GT be two cyclic groups of
the same big prime order p, and g be a generator of G. let
e : G×G → GT be a pairing, i.e. a map satisﬁes the following
properties:
• Bilinearity. e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab for any a, b ∈ Z∗p.
• Non-degenerate. e(g, g) is a generator of group GT .
• Computability. e can be computed efﬁciently.
We denote BSetup as an algorithm that takes as input the
security parameter 1λ and outputs the parameters for a bilinear
map as (p, g,G,GT , e).
2) Decisional Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman (DBDH) Assump-
tion: Let e : G × G → GT be a bilinear map, both G and
GT are cyclic groups of prime order p. Choose a random
generator g of G and random a, b, c, z from Z∗p. The decisional
Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman (DBDH) problem is to distinguish
between the tuples of the form (g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) and
(g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z). An algorithm A has an advantage  in
solving DBDH if
|Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) = 1]−
Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z) = 1]| ≥ .
The decisional Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman (DBDH) assumption
is that for any efﬁcient A,  is negligible.
3) Extended Discrete Logarithm (eDL) Assumption: Let
G be a cyclic group of prime order p. Choose a random
generator g of G and random a, b from Z∗p. The extended
discrete logarithm (eDL) problem is to compute a/b from the
tuple (g, ga, gb). An algorithm A has an advantage  in solving
eDL if
Pr[A(g, ga, gb) = a/b] ≥ .
The extended discrete logarithm (eDL) assumption is that for
any efﬁcient A,  is negligible.
III. THE PROPOSED HSPE SCHEME
In this section, we present our concrete HSPE scheme which
is based on the identity-based encryption scheme due to Boneh
and Franklin [20]. The details are as follows.
• Setup: On input the security parameter 1λ, it runs
BSetup(1λ) to obtain (p, g,G,GT , e). After that, it
chooses a random sk from Z∗p and computes pk = g
sk.
It also chooses a secure cryptographic hash function H :
{0, 1}∗ → G. The security analysis will consider H as
random oracle. At last, it publishes (p, g,G,GT , e, pk,H)
as the public-key while keeping sk secret.
• Rand: On input a keyword kw, it outputs kw′ =
H(kw)r as the masked keyword and s = r as the state,
where r is chosen randomly from Z∗p.
• Trap: On input a masked keyword kw′ = H(kw)r
and the private key sk, it outputs a trapdoor trapkw =
(kw′)sk.
• Token: On input a trapdoor trapkw and a state s, it
outputs a token tokenkw = trap
1/s
kw .
• Index: On input a keyword kw and the public-





kw ) = (g
t, e(H(kw), pk)t), where t is chosen
randomly from Z∗p.
• Test: On input a token tokenkwt and an index IkwI ,










Correctness: We can easily obtain the correctness of
our proposal according to the correctness of Boneh-
Franklin scheme [20]. Especially, when kwt = kwI ,














, and e(tokenkwt , I
(1)
kwI
) = I(2)kwI if
kwt = kwI .
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will prove that our proposal holds the
index anonymity, token anonymity and one-token-per-trapdoor
security properties in the random oracle model.
Theorem 1 (Index Anonymity). Our proposal holds the index
anonymity based on the DBDH assumption in the random
oracle model.
Proof: Assume that A is an index anonymity adversary
that has advantage  against our proposal, then we can build
an algorithm B solving the DBDH problem with advantage at
least 4/e2(2+q)2 via interacting A with the following game,
where A makes at most q > 0 hash queries.
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• Setup: The challenger C takes a DBDH tuple
(g, ga, gb, gc, T ), where T is either e(g, g)abc or e(g, g)z.
B sets public-key as (g, pk = ga, H). Note that sk = a
is unknown to B. H is a random oracle controlled by B
as described below.
Oh: All hash values in this game are generated from this
oracle. To answer the hash queries, algorithm B should
maintain a list named H list of tuples {kwi, Qi, αi, coini}
that is built as below. H list is initially empty, and
algorithm B responds the hash queries kwi as follows.
1) If kwi exists in a tuple {kwi, Qi, αi, coini} of H list
then algorithm B responds with H(kwi) = Qi ∈
G
∗.
2) Otherwise, B chooses a random coini ∈ {0, 1} with
Pr[coini = 0] = δ, where δ will be determined
later. Algorithm B chooses a random αi ∈ Z∗p. If
coini = 0 compute Qi = gαi ∈ G∗; otherwise,
Qi = (g
b)αi . At last, algorithm B adds the tuple
{kwi, Qi, αi, coini} into H list and responds to A
with H(kwi) = Qi.
Note that either way Qi is uniformly distributed in G∗
and independent of A’s current view as required.
• Phase 1: B builds the following oracles.
– Orand: This oracle maintains a list of tuples
{kwi, kw′i, si}, named Rlist. On input kwi, algo-
rithm B chooses a random ri and sets kw′i = Qrii
and si = ri, where Qi is from Oh(kwi). At last,
algorithm B gives (kw′i, si) to algorithm A and
stores (kwi, kw′i, si) into R
list.
– Otrap: On input kw′i, algorithm B searches kw′i in
Rlist. If it does not exist, algorithm B refuses this
query; otherwise, it searches kwi in H list. If coini =
0, compute trapkwi = (g
a)αisi , where αi and si are
the values corresponding to kwi in H list and Rlist,
respectively; otherwise, it reports failure and aborts.
– Otoken: On input a pair (trapi, si), B responds A
with tokeni = trap
1/si
i .
• Challenge: A sends two keywords kw∗0 , kw∗1 with the
restrictions speciﬁed in the index anonymity game. B
queries Oh with kw∗0 and kw∗1 . If coinkw∗0 = 0 or
coinkw∗1 = 0, then it reports failure and aborts. Other-
wise, it computes I∗kw∗b = (g
c, T
αkw∗
b ), where b is chosen
randomly. Note that if T = e(g, g)abc, then I∗kw∗b is a
valid index of keyword kw∗b .
• Phase 2: Almost the same as Phase 1, except that kw0
and kw1 should follow the restriction as speciﬁed in the
index anonymity game.
• Guess: A outputs a guess b′ of b.
If algorithm B does not abort during the simulation and the
input tuple is sampled from e(g, g)abc, then algorithm A’s
view is identical to its view in a real attack game and therefore
A satisﬁes |Pr[b = b′]− 1/2| ≥ .
To complete the proof, it remains to calculate the probability
that algorithm B does not abort during the simulation, while
the analysis can be proceeded similar as that in [20]. The
probability that B does not abort in phase 1 or 2 is δq which
is same as [20]. While in the challenge phase, B queries Oh
twice. Hence, the probability that B does not abort during the
challenge phase is (1−δ)2. So, the probability that B does not
abort in this game is δq(1−δ)2. When δ = q/(2+q), this value
is maximized which is 4/e2(2+q)2. Therefore, the probability
that B does not abort is at least 4/e2(2+ q)2, where A makes
at most q > 0 hash queries. As a result, B’s advantage is at
least 4/e2(2 + q)2 as required.
Theorem 2 (Token Anonymity). Our proposal holds the token
anonymity, and the adversary’s advantage is zero.
Proof: We will show that A’s winning probability is exact
1/2 in the below.
• Setup: The challenger C runs Setup(1λ) to obtain the
key pair (pk, sk), and sends pk to A while keeping sk
secret.
• Phase 1: The challenger C builds the following oracles.
– Osk(pk): The challenger C simply returns sk to the
adversary A.
– Orand: On input kwi, the challenger C runs
Rand(kwi, pk) to obtain (kw′i, si) and sends
(kw′i, si) to A.
– Otrap: On input kw′i, the challenger C runs
Trap(kw′i, sk, pk) to obtain trapkwi and sends
trapkwi to A.
– Otoken: On input a pair (trapi, si), the challenger
C runs Token(trapi, si) to obtain tokenkwi and
sends tokenkwi to A.
• Challenge: A sends two keywords kw∗0 , kw∗1 with the
restrictions speciﬁed in the token anonymity game. C
chooses coin from {0, 1} randomly. If coin = 1, it re-
turns H(kw∗b )
r to A, where b and r are chosen randomly
from {0, 1} and Z∗p, respectively. If coin = 0, it returns
a random R∗ from G to A.
• Phase 2: Identical to Phase 1.
• Guess: A outputs a guess b′ of b.
It is easy to see that if R∗ is responded to A, then Pr[b′ =
b] = 1/2. On the other hand, r is chosen randomly from Z∗p,
hence H(kw∗b )
r has the same distribution with R from the
view of the adversary and we have that Pr[b′ = b] = 1/2
when H(kw∗b )
r is responded to A.
Theorem 3 (One-Token-Per-Trapdoor). Our proposal holds
the one-token-per-trapdoor security based on the eDL assump-
tion in the random oracle model.
Proof: Assume that A is a one-token-per-trapdoor adver-
sary that has advantage  against our proposal, then we can
build an algorithm B solving the eDL problem by interacting
with A as follows.
• Setup: The challenger C takes an eDL tuple {g, ga, gb},
and runs Setup(1λ) to obtain the key pair (pk, sk), and
sends pk to A while keeping sk secret. H is a random
oracle controlled by B as described below.
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Oh: All hash values in the game are generated from this
oracle. To answer the hash queries, algorithm B should
maintain a list named H list of tuples (kwi, Qi, αi, coini)
that is built as below. H list is initially empty, and
algorithm B responds the hash queries kwi as follows.
1) If kwi exists in a tuple (kwi, Qi, αi, coini) of H list
then algorithm B responds with H(kwi) = Qi ∈
G
∗.
2) Otherwise, B chooses a random coini ∈ {0, 1} with
Pr[coini = 0] = δ, where δ will be determined
later. Algorithm B chooses a random αi ∈ Z∗p. If
coini = 0 compute Qi = (ga)αi ∈ G∗; otherwise,
Qi = (g
b)αi . At last, algorithm B adds the tuple
(kwi, Qi, αi, coini) into H list and responds to A
with H(kwi) = Qi.
Note that either way Qi is uniformly distributed in G∗
and independent of A’s current view as required.
• Phase 1: B builds the following oracles.
– Orand: On input kwi, B runs Rand(kwi, pk) to
obtain (kw′i, si) and sends (kw
′
i, si) to A.
– Otrap: On input kw′i, B runs Trap(kw′i, sk, pk) to
obtain trapkwi and sends trapkwi to A.
– Otoken: On input a tuple (trapi, si), B runs
Token(trapi, si) to obtain tokenkwi and sends
tokenkwi to A.
• Challenge:A sends a masked keyword kw′∗ to B. B
runs Trap(kw′∗, sk, pk) to obtain trapkw∗ and sends
trapkw∗ to A.
• Phase 2: Identical to Phase 1.




′∗, s∗b) ← Rand(kw∗b , pk)
and kw∗0 = kw∗1 , where b ∈ {0, 1}. We have that
(token∗kw∗0 )
s∗0 = (token∗kw∗1 )
s∗1 = (kw′∗)sk.
Once A outputs (token∗kw∗0 , s∗0) and (token∗kw∗1 , s∗1), B
searches (token∗kw∗0 )
1/sk and (token∗kw∗1 )
1/sk in H list, and







H list. If coin∗0 = coin
∗
1, B reports failure and aborts; other-
wise, B can solve the eDL problem as follows.
• If coin∗0 = 0 and coin
∗
1 = 1, then we have that a·α∗0 ·s∗0 =
b · α∗1 · s∗1 ⇒ a/b = α∗1 · s∗1/(α∗0 · s∗0).
• If coin∗0 = 1 and coin
∗
1 = 0, then we have that b·α∗0 ·s∗0 =
a · α∗1 · s∗1 ⇒ a/b = α∗0 · s∗0/(α∗1 · s∗1).
It is easy to see that the probability of coin∗0 = coin∗1 is
2δ · (1− δ) which is maximized at δopt = 1/2. Using δopt, the
probability that B solves the eDL problem with 1/2 at least as
required.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the problem how to keep the
keyword corresponding to the trapdoor secret from the data
owner. At the same time, we also proposed the security notion
named one-token-per-trapdoor that aims to protect the beneﬁt
of the data owner. In particular, we present the concept of
hidden-token searchable public-key encryption, including the
deﬁnitions and security models. Furthermore, we gave a con-
crete hidden-token searchable public-key encryption scheme
together with the security proofs in the random oracle model.
In the future, we would like to study the new scheme proven-
secure in the standard model or with more expressive keyword
search.
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